Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

被引：37
|
作者：
Flesch, J
Thuijsman, F
Vrieze, K
机构：
[1] Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, 6200 MD Maastricht
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1997年 / 26卷 / 03期
关键词：
Economic Theory; Game Theory; Similar Type; Stochastic Game; Markov Strategy;
D O I：
10.1007/BF01263273
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary epsilon-equilibria (epsilon > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.
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页码：303 / 314
页数：12
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