Contest and Indifference: Two Models of Open-Minded Inquiry

被引:1
|
作者
Spiegel, James S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Taylor Univ, Dept Philosophy, 236 West Reade Ave, Upland, IN 46989 USA
关键词
Virtue; Open-mindedness; Sextus Empiricus; John Locke; John Stuart Mill; Paul Feyerabend;
D O I
10.1007/s11406-017-9850-z
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
While open-mindedness as an intellectual trait has been recognized for centuries, Western philosophers have not explicitly endorsed it as a virtue until recently. This acknowledgment has been roughly coincident with the rise of virtue epistemology. As with any virtue, it is important to inform contemporary discussion of open-mindedness with reflection on sources from the history of philosophy. Here I do just this. After reviewing two major accounts of open-mindedness, which I dub "Contest" and "Indifference," I explore some ideas pertinent to the subject in four philosophers spanning eighteen centuries: Sextus Empiricus, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Paul Feyerabend. Despite their varying concerns and terminology, their contributions may valuably inform current reflection on the virtue of open-mindedness, whether construed in terms of the Contest or Indifference account.
引用
收藏
页码:789 / 810
页数:22
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