The pragmatic anthropology as a doctrine of prudence in the versions of the courses of anthropology from Kant

This article aims to evidence that the idea of pragmatic anthropology developed in the versions of the courses of anthropology that are Collegentwiirfe, Menschenkunde and Anthropologie Dohna-Wundlackende, occupies of a moral definition, because it is subordinated to the doctrine of prudence. This doctrine is understood as the capacity from the human beings to influence each other according to certain goals, the ones that should be useful in social life. Besides that, we will delimit that the meaning of the pragmatic adjective present in these versions of the courses of anthropology was withdrawn from the work Initia Philosophiae practicae prima from Baumgarten, because in the notes of Kant about this work the pragmatic motives will always determine private laws of the will, the ones who may, a priori, represent a moral interest and, a posteriori, the accomplishment of a desired end by its finite rational being. By this reason, we defend to have in the quoted Kantian works a synonymy between the notion of pragmatic anthropology and the doctrine of prudence.