The Soviet 1931-1933 famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a new interpretation possible, what would its consequences be?

The present article uses the many, outstanding studies published in recent years to sketch the outline of a possible new reading of the 1931-1933 Soviet famines and of the Ukrainian Holodomor. This reading takes into account both the general, and complex Soviet picture, and the undeniable relevance of the national question. The author hopes this way to further the understanding of the "Great famine" and to stimulate a debate that will contribute to pulling down the wall that stands today between Ukrainian, Russian and Western students of the Soviet famines as well as the even taller and stronger one isolating these students from their colleagues studying the European twentieth century. At the end of the essay the author addresses the question of whether and in which sense the Ukrainian Holodomor belongs to the genocide category. He answers positively, but nevertheless remarks differences from the Jewish Holocaust and notes that the famine was not a "planned" genocide conceived in "Moscow" by Russians who were then also suffering from hunger, albeit less dramatically. Rather, Stalin and the communist party leaders decided to take advantage of a famine caused by their own blunders, but which they did not want or expect, to teach a lesson to peasants in general and Ukraine in particular. Their decision, taken in the fall of 1932, explains why the famine grew into a Holodomor. Insofar as this was therefore the consequence of conscious human policies, the term genocide can be used.