Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

In recent years Open Innovation (OI) processes have been receiving growing attention from the empirical and theoretical economic literature, where a debate is taking place on the aspects of complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and 01 spillover. By means of a differential game approach, we analyze the case of substitutability in an 01 setup in a Cournot duopoly where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival. The technical analysis and the numerical simulations point out that the firm which commits to a higher level of 01 absorption produces a smaller output and enjoys higher profits than its rival. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.