Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail-Institutional Fund Twins

被引:76
|
作者
Evans, Richard B. [1 ]
Fahlenbrach, Ruediger [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Virginia, Darden Sch Business, Charlottesville, VA 22906 USA
[2] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
来源
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2012年 / 25卷 / 12期
关键词
G23; G34; BOARD STRUCTURE; PERFORMANCE; SHAREHOLDERS; OWNERSHIP; US; PERSISTENCE; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; SELECTION; COSTS;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhs105
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Advisors often manage multiple versions of a fund. These "twins" have the same manager and similar performance but are sold to different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Comparing investor flows in retail and institutional twins, we find that institutional investors are more sensitive to high fees and poor risk-adjusted performance. Consistent with the reduction of agency problems from greater monitoring, retail funds with an institutional twin outperform other retail funds by 1.5% per year. After the institutional twin is created, expenses decrease while measures of managerial effort at the retail fund increase.
引用
收藏
页码:3530 / 3571
页数:42
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