Redact to protect? Customers' incentive to protect information and suppliers' disclosure strategies

被引:12
|
作者
Chen, Gary [1 ]
Tian, Xiaoli [2 ,4 ]
Yu, Miaomiao [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Coll Business Adm, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
[2] Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[3] Louisiana State Univ, EJ Ourso Coll Business, Baton Rouge, LA 70808 USA
[4] Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, 420 Rafik B Hariri, Washington, DC 20057 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2022年 / 74卷 / 01期
关键词
Supply chain; Customer; Supplier; Disclosure; PROPRIETARY INFORMATION; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; BASE CONCENTRATION; COMPETITIVE COSTS; BAD NEWS; PROFITABILITY; PERFORMANCE; POWER; IMPACT; CHAIN;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101490
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that suppliers are more likely to redact mandated disclosures when major cus-tomers have proprietary information to protect (in the form of R&D intensity, trade secrets, and nondisclosure agreements), controlling for suppliers' own proprietary cost concerns. Furthermore, the effect on suppliers' redactions is concentrated in subsamples for which customers have greater power, measured by customer size, industry leadership, and the number of suppliers. Additionally, suppliers also curtail operations-related disclosures in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and product-and service-related press releases when customers likely have proprietary information to protect. Overall, these findings suggest that dependent suppliers internalize their customers' disclosure in-centives and curtail disclosures, catering to customers' demand for information protection.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:24
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