UNFUNDED PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY

被引:4
|
作者
Andersen, Torben M. [1 ]
Bhattacharya, Joydeep [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Aarhus, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
[2] Iowa State Univ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
关键词
Pensions; Social Security; Dynamic Efficiency; Endogenous Labor Supply; OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL; SOCIAL-SECURITY; RISK-AVERSION; CONSUMPTION; EQUILIBRIA; EFFICIENCY; DEBT;
D O I
10.1017/S1365100511000794
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A classic result in dynamic public economics states that there is no welfare rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions in a dynamically efficient overlapping-generations economy with exogenous labor supply. Parenthetically, a welfare justification for PAYG pensions exists if the economy is dynamically inefficient. Under the sufficient condition that the old be no less risk-averse than the young, both these results extend to an economy with endogenous labor supply.
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页码:971 / 997
页数:27
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