Towards a conceptual model of whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors

Whistle-blowing has received considerable attention in the ethics literature. However, following the collapse of Arthur Andersen in the Enron debacle, whistle-blowing within audit firms has taken on greater importance. Given the profession's requirements to be confidential, independent and to act in the public interest (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002), there is a need for a model that is specific to the audit profession (e.g. Louwers, Ponemon, & Radtke, 1997), and in particular, that addresses auditors' whistle-blowing intentions. This paper presents a conceptual model on whistle-blowing intentions among external auditors where an auditor's individual factors (attitudes toward whistle-blowing, perceived behavioural control, independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting and personal cost of reporting) have a direct influence on his or her intentions to whistle-blow, but are moderated by isomorphic factors (perceived organisational support and team norms) and issue-specific factors (perceived moral intensity). Using justice and institutional theories, the proposed model anticipates that whistle-blowing within an audit firm produces both positive and negative consequences to society, the audit firm and the individual whistle-blower. However, where audit firms have adequate formal supporting mechanisms for reporting wrongdoings to internal and external parties, the negative effects and personal costs of reporting will be minimised. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.