International Influences and the Design of Judicial Review Institutions in Francophone Africa

A key feature of the political liberalization movements that engulfed Africa in the 1990s was the constitutional reforms many of them generated. In addition to pursuing regime change, there was also the desire to change the political landscape. Across French-speaking Africa, many countries substantially amended their constitutions or wrote new ones as part of the movement to create political governance systems based on human rights, the rule of law and constitutionalism. In most cases, the reforms established specialized institutions of judicial review, modeled largely on the French Conseil Constitutionnel created in 1958. Contrary to popular belief and owing to the circumstances of their development, some of these institutions took a more integrative and innovative approach than that of the French Constitution, by borrowing more evolved features of judicial review systems elsewhere, and by developing untested sui generis features. In what ways did this happen? What are these features and what factors account for them? How is this relevant to the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and constitutionalism in francophone Africa? Focusing specifically on sub-Saharan francop hone Africa, this paper addresses these questions. It will show that from the outset, constitution makers in this region were already tailoring the design of judicial review institutions to local circumstances, despite external influences.