International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?

被引:114
|
作者
DeMeritt, Jacqueline H. R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ N Texas, Denton, TX 76203 USA
关键词
empirical implications of theoretical models; extralegal killing; naming and shaming; SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS; HUMAN-RIGHTS; MASS MURDER; REPRESSION; DELEGATION; DEMOCRACY; TIMES;
D O I
10.1080/03050629.2012.726180
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.
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页码:597 / 621
页数:25
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