empirical implications of theoretical models;
extralegal killing;
naming and shaming;
SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS;
HUMAN-RIGHTS;
MASS MURDER;
REPRESSION;
DELEGATION;
DEMOCRACY;
TIMES;
D O I:
10.1080/03050629.2012.726180
中图分类号:
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号:
030207 ;
摘要:
Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.
机构:
Hankuk Univ Foreign Studies, Div Language & Diplomacy, Int Polit Econ, Seoul, South KoreaHankuk Univ Foreign Studies, Div Language & Diplomacy, Int Polit Econ, Seoul, South Korea
Woo, Byungwon
Murdie, Amanda
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Georgia, Sch Publ & Int Affairs, Dept Int Affairs, Athens, GA 30602 USAHankuk Univ Foreign Studies, Div Language & Diplomacy, Int Polit Econ, Seoul, South Korea
机构:
Carnegie Endowment Int Peace, Washington, DC 20037 USA
Temple Univ, Sch Law, Law, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USAGeorge Washington Univ, Polit Sci & Int Affairs, Washington, DC 20052 USA