Social-ethical responsibility in South Africa: A Levinasian perspective

On the question regarding the injustice in the South African social reality, two approaches have recurrently been followed; the 'individual guilt' approach on the one hand, and the 'systemic guilt' approach on the other hand. Drawing on the notion that the subject is on a pre-reflective level 'held hostage by the neighbour', this article elaborates on the significance of Levinas' social ethics to post-apartheid South Africa. The strength of Levinas' phenomenological approach is its confirmation of the primacy of ethics in our time. This makes possible a depth-perspective on the everyday ethical discourse that can complement the deficiencies of the approaches mentioned above. I argue that Levinas ought not to be understood as representative of a 'samaritanian' ethics. While Levinas gives emphasis to responsibility in the first person, he also clearly delineates the indispensable importance to ethics of institutions and a good social order. Along these lines, I oppose the apparent quietism of a Derridian approach recently followed in local academic literature. The article concludes with a discussion on the possibility of the concretisation of the Good in Levinas.