Monopsony Power in Migrant Labor Markets: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates

被引:51
|
作者
Naidu, Suresh [1 ]
Nyarko, Yaw [2 ,3 ]
Wang, Shing-Yi [4 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
[3] New York Univ, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
[4] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
SEARCH; COMPETITION; MIGRATION; SELECTION; MODELS;
D O I
10.1086/688877
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
By exploiting a reform in the United Arab Emirates that relaxed restrictions on employer transitions, we provide new estimates of the monopsony power of firms over migrant workers. Our results show that the reform increased incumbent migrants' earnings and firm retention. This occurs despite an increase in employer transitions and is driven by a fall in country exits. While the outcomes of incumbents improved, the reform decreased demand for new migrants and lowered their earnings. These results are consistent with a model of monopsony in which firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves for both new recruits in source countries and incumbent migrants.
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收藏
页码:1735 / 1792
页数:58
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