Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games

被引:2
|
作者
Beggs, A. W. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford Wadham Coll, Oxford OX1 3PN, England
关键词
Bayesian games; Monotone strategies; Robustness; Uniqueness; Index theory; Regularity; PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA; EXISTENCE; THEOREM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types. It analyzes the robustness of equilibria with respect to perturbations. It also proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:145 / 158
页数:14
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