Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

被引:39
|
作者
Stupple, Edward J. N. [1 ]
Ball, Linden J. [2 ]
Ellis, Daniel [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Derby, Ctr Psychol Res, Derby DE22 1GB, England
[2] Univ Lancaster, Dept Psychol, Lancaster LA1 4YF, England
关键词
Matching bias; Deduction; Dual-process theory; Individual differences; Reasoning; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; WORKING-MEMORY; BELIEF BIAS; SYSTEMS; LOGIC; CONFLICT; MODELS; DIFFICULTY; RESOLUTION; TASK;
D O I
10.1080/13546783.2012.735622
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts (2005) negations paradigm was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic conflict problems. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.
引用
收藏
页码:54 / 77
页数:24
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