A situated perspective of knowledge of everyday life

This essay argues for a situated character of knowledge of everyday life. As a starting point, relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of "form of life", we propose that our decisions are fundamentally practical uses of historically constructed rules systems and, therefore, those are irreducible to algorithmic procedures of rational cost-benefit evaluation. Later, to address the question of the conditions that make possible the subjective incorporation of these rules and, with it, our practical sense, we recover some approaches from the "background" thesis of John Searle and habitus by Pierre Bourdieu. After this discussion, from Donna Haraway's perspective of situated knowledge, we propose that the conformation of that sense is always partial; that is, related to embodied articulatory practices. Finally, we argue that the perspective of situated knowledge represents a plausible alternative to theoretically and methodologically support an approach to knowledge of everyday life.