Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

被引：0

作者：

Sanchez, Marcelo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] European Cent Bank, D-60311 Frankfurt, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2013年 / 120卷 / 03期

关键词：

Wage setting; Central bank transparency; Monetary strictness; Optimal delegation; Calibration; REGIMES; PRICE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.020

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Optimal delegation restores the beneficial effects of non-accommodating monetary policy when the central bank is allowed to be not fully transparent about its response to wages. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：392 / 396

页数：5

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