The article presents the first comprehensive study of a decentralized management system in the field of the electoral process, including its theoretical understanding and the systematization of the empirical evidence from different countries that use a decentralized model of electoral management. One of the goals of the work is to reconsider a decentralized model of electoral management, which is viewed in the modern scientific literature mainly in a negative way. In contrast to this approach, N.Grishin and A.M.R.Leenders propose the interpretation of this model as one of the institutional factors that contribute to democratic and fair elections. On the basis of the cross-case analysis and the principles of traditional institutionalism, the authors identify the main forms and parameters of the decentralized electoral governance, taking into account both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of this process. They also identify the distinguishing features of both centralized and decentralized models of electoral governance and analyze in details administrative and political effects of decentralization in the field of electoral management, such as specialization in the implementation of certain managerial functions, impartiality in decision-making, openness to innovations, inclusivity, transparency, reduction in opportunities for power abuse, corruption and fraud, and increased trust in the electoral system and election results. The article shows that a peculiar system of checks and balances is one of the most important features of a decentralized model of electoral management. The authors also consider prospects of turning the principle of decentralized electoral governance into one of the new electoral standards.