Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

被引:0
|
作者
Chillemi, Ottorino [1 ]
Galavotti, Stefano [2 ]
Gui, Benedetto [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Padua, Dept Econ & Management, Padua, Italy
[2] Univ Bari, Dept Econ Management & Corp Law, Largo Abbazia Santa Scolastica 53, I-70124 Bari, Italy
[3] Sophia Univ Inst, Dept Econ & Management, Valdarno, Italy
关键词
Ex-post information; signal; contingent contracts; CORRELATED INFORMATION; EXTRACTION; SURPLUS; AGENCY; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109202
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the contractual design problem of a seller that observes an ex-post signal correlated with the buyer's valuation and can make the allocation, but not payments, contingent on it. We show that, to maximize her profit, the seller should offer a menu of contracts whereby the good is transferred to the buyer only if the signal is sufficiently low. The welfare implications of these contracts are also discussed. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:4
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