Battleground states and voter participation in US presidential elections: an empirical test

被引:3
|
作者
Cebula, Richard J. [1 ]
Duquette, Christopher M. [2 ]
Mixon, Franklin G. [3 ]
机构
[1] Jacksonville Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Jacksonville, FL 32211 USA
[2] Mitre Corp, Mclean, VA 22102 USA
[3] Columbus State Univ, D Abbott Turner Coll Business & Comp Sci, Columbus, GA 31907 USA
关键词
voter participation; battleground states; incentives to vote; benefits of voting; PARADOX;
D O I
10.1080/00036846.2012.727981
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The winner-take-all method of allocating Electoral College votes (in 48 of the 50 states) in US presidential elections has promoted interesting behaviours by politicians and states that are evident throughout US (economic) history. This analysis explores the impact that being a battleground state in presidential elections has on future voter participation rates. After quantifying the degree to which each state is a battleground state, the empirical analysis proffers what it refers to as the battleground voting hypothesis, which argues that the greater the degree to which a given state is a battleground state, the greater the expected benefits from voting in that state and hence the greater the voter turnout in that state. The empirical results suggest that the top-to-bottom battleground state effect generated an average of 7.8 additional percentage points in voter participation in presidential elections over the period 19642008 for those states at the top of the scale.
引用
收藏
页码:3795 / 3799
页数:5
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