NON-NORMATIVE LOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE REVENGE OF THE NORMATIVITY OBJECTION

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L-1 and L-2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Gamma to phi, which is valid in L-1 but invalid in L-2. If you accept all sentences in Gamma, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject phi. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept phi or suspend judgment about phi. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.