Patent assertion entities (PAEs) are playing an increasingly active role in Europe. Their activities are controversial in that although they may be a source of efficiencies, they may also create anticompetitive harm. Given the growing trend of operating companies transferring patents to PAEs to increase their licensing revenues, the risks of anticompetitive harm created by PAE activities must be taken seriously. When analyzing the impact of PAE activities on competition, a distinction must be drawn between "pure" PAEs, which acquire patents from a variety of sources and generate revenues by asserting them, and "hybrid" PAEs, which acquire patents from operating companies and maintain a relationship with these companies postacquisition. Although pure PAEs create risks of exploitation, hybrid PAEs create exclusionary concerns as such PAEs may be used by operating companies to harm their rivals on downstream product markets. These exclusionary concerns are particularly serious when the operating company retains a significant degree of control over the PAE's activities following the transfer of the patents. As there is currently no EU competition case-law on the activities of PAEs, this article attempts to show through hypotheticals that depending on the circumstances of each case, privateering may lead to exclusion.
机构:George Mason Univ, Sch Law, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
Wright, Joshua D.
Ginsburg, Douglas H.
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George Mason Univ, Sch Law, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
United States Court Appeals Dist Columbia Circuit, Washington, DC USAGeorge Mason Univ, Sch Law, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
机构:
Georgetown Univ, Dept Justice, Antitrust Div, Law Ctr, Washington, DC 20057 USA
Georgetown Univ, Law Ctr, Washington, DC 20057 USAGeorgetown Univ, Dept Justice, Antitrust Div, Law Ctr, Washington, DC 20057 USA
Popofsky, Mark S.
Laufert, Michael D.
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机构:Georgetown Univ, Dept Justice, Antitrust Div, Law Ctr, Washington, DC 20057 USA