This research examines the outcome of renegotiations that happened between the UK government and private investors in the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project and develops a model to formalise the evolution of bargaining power of these two parties in the contracting period. This model makes two novel contributions in the development of theoretical understanding to hold-up problems for project management: (1) the effect of financial arrangement on bargaining power balance is quantitatively examined; and (2) the relationship between bargaining power and quasi-rent is established through the application of the Nash bargaining model. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
机构:
Bartlett School of Construction, Project Management, UCL, United Kingdom
Advanced Institute of Management Research, United KingdomBartlett School of Construction, Project Management, UCL, United Kingdom
Chang, Chen-Yu
Ive, Graham
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机构:
Bartlett School of Construction, Project Management, UCL, United KingdomBartlett School of Construction, Project Management, UCL, United Kingdom
机构:
UCL, OMEGA Ctr, Bartlett Sch Planning, London, England
European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
UK Treasury, London, EnglandUCL, OMEGA Ctr, Bartlett Sch Planning, London, England