The Body and Moral Phenomenology

The "corporeal turn" which has taken place in 20th century thought, is closely related with the discovery of corporeality as a key motive of philosophical ethics. The aim of the present paper is to present and compare two phenomenological contributions to "bodily ethics" - the first one consists in an ethical interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, while the second one is explicitly contained in the thought of E. Levinas. The starting point of our analysis is the conception of intersubjectivity which differs radically in the thought of the two philosophers. While Merleau-Ponty stresses especially the primordial inter-corporeal resonance and empathy between myself and the other, Levinas' view is based on the idea of an irreducible alterity of the other, which makes him to consider the relation between myself and the other as essentially asymmetrical. We attempt to show that the relation between Levinas' and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of intersubjectivity is far more complex than it seems and that in order to develop the moral phenomenology of corporeality in a productive way, it is necessary to overcome certain one-sidedness both in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. This overcoming is unthinkable without taking over the most productive motives of both philosophers' views of intersubjectivity and corporeality