APPEALS FROM DISCRETIONS, SATISFACTIONS AND VALUE JUDGMENTS: REVIEWING THE HOUSE RULES

被引:0
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作者
Edmonds, Chris
机构
来源
MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW | 2017年 / 41卷 / 02期
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D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The general rules governing appeals seem well settled. Where the decision challenged involves the exercise of a discretion, broadly described to include states of satisfaction and value judgments, the principles developed in House v The King apply. Under the House rules, the appellant must identify either specific error of fact or law or inferred error (eg where the decision is unreasonable or clearly unjust). However, beneath this apparently settled framework, the law raises complex and unresolved issues. That the court should exercise such restraint is periodically challenged. The House rules in themselves are of limited value in identifying how appeals from discretionary decisions differ from appeals generally. What constitutes the exercise of a 'discretion', what is the relationship between the exercise of a 'discretion' and the making of a 'value judgment', and what rules respectively apply are the subject of conflicting decisions. Whilst the House appears presentable, internally it requires attention.
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页码:647 / 688
页数:42
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