Supply Chain Contract Design of Technology Innovation Collaboration Under Asymmetric Information

被引:1
|
作者
Wang, Na [1 ,2 ]
Zhang, Zhenji [1 ]
Gao, Ruize [1 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Lab Logist Management & Technol, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
来源
LISS 2014 | 2015年
关键词
Supply chain; Technology innovation collaboration; Asymmetric information; Dynamic game; Principal-agent theory; Contract design;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_40
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Supply chain technology innovation collaboration has the characteristics of high uncertainty and risk. Through the equitable distribution of the proceeds compact design can enhance supply chain competitive advantages and help achieve maximum benefit. It assumes a case study of technology innovation collaboration in a manufacturing enterprise, of which the enterprises' strength and effort level are asymmetric information. This paper firstly analysis the enterprises' profit-sharing issues in the supply chain through dynamic game. Then it creates the collaborative model with principal-agent theory, and studies the game strategy of cooperative innovation. The research is expected to provide a theoretical support for supply chain enterprises, to help the enterprises grasp the cooperative innovation rules, formulate the technology innovation collaboration strategy and improve the overall competitiveness.
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 265
页数:7
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