Agential Knowledge, Action and Process

Claims concerning processes, claims of the form "x is phi ing", have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form "x is phi ing" is true when what is happening with x is such that, if it is not interrupted, a phi ing will occur. It then applies itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when "x is phi ing" describes x's intentional action, it is true iff x is acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to phi, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will phi. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon-copier example Donald Davidson gives in "Intending" fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is phi ing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies.