Inferences about mental states

被引:289
|
作者
Mitchell, Jason P. [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
social neuroscience; self; mentalizing; TEMPORO-PARIETAL JUNCTION; VENTROMEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX; FRONTOTEMPORAL DEMENTIA; LOBE CONTRIBUTIONS; SOCIAL COGNITION; MIND; SELF; BRAIN; VOLUNTARY; PERSPECTIVE;
D O I
10.1098/rstb.2008.0318
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Human social cognition relies on an ability to predict what others will think, feel or do in novel situations. Research in social neuroscience has consistently observed several brain regions that contribute ubiquitously to these abilities, including medial prefrontal cortex and aspects of lateral and medial parietal cortex. Interestingly, parallel work has suggested that this same network of regions subserves several seemingly distinct phenomena - notably, the abilities to remember the past, imagine the future and visualize spatial layouts - suggesting the existence of a common set of cognitive processes devoted to projecting oneself into worlds that differ mentally, temporally or physically from one's current experience. This use of self-projection to understand others' minds requires perceivers to solve three distinct cognitive challenges: (i) generating a simulated facsimile of one's own hypothetical mental states in a given situation, (ii) suppressing one's own current mental states, and (iii) deciding on the appropriateness of simulated states for understanding a particular other person. The present paper reviews recent psychology and neuroscience research aimed at understanding the underlying mechanisms that allow humans to solve each of these cognitive challenges to use self-projection to predict and understand the mental states of others.
引用
收藏
页码:1309 / 1316
页数:8
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