Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Merger Decisions

被引：23

作者：

Lin, Chen ^{[1
]}

Officer, Micah S. ^{[2
]}

Shen, Beibei ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] Loyola Marymount Univ, Coll Business Adm, Los Angeles, CA 90045 USA

[3] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 2018年 / 53卷 / 02期

关键词：

STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; AGENCY COSTS; CEO WEALTH; FIRM; DEBT; DETERMINANTS;

D O I：

10.1017/S0022109017001260

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.

引用

页码：643 / 680

页数：38

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