Rents and quasi rents in the wage structure: Evidence from hostile takeovers

被引：7
|
作者：
Neumark, D
Sharpe, SA
机构：
[1] NATL BUR ECON RES, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA
[2] FED RESERVE SYST, WASHINGTON, DC 20551 USA
来源：
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS | 1996年 / 35卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1111/j.1468-232X.1996.tb00400.x
中图分类号：
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号：
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We test whether industry-related variation in wage premia and slopes of wage profiles reflects payments of rents or quasi rents, taking our cue from the wealth-transfer hypothesis, which argues that hostile takeovers target such rents. If these wage structure characteristics reflect extramarginal payments, then hostile takeover attempts that sought to transfer wealth from workers to shareholders should have targeted firms with the highest wage premia or the steepest wage profiles. We find that the likelihood of being a hostile takeover target between 1979 and 1989 was generally unrelated to these industry-related characteristics of the wage structure.
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页码：145 / 179
页数：35
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