Risk equalization in competitive health insurance markets: Identifying healthy individuals on the basis of multiple-year low spending

被引:2
|
作者
Eijkenaar, Frank [1 ]
van Vliet, Rene C. J. A. [1 ]
van Kleef, Richard C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Erasmus Univ, Erasmus Sch Hlth Policy & Management, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
关键词
health insurance; health measurement; risk equalization; spending; survey data; PLAN PAYMENT SYSTEMS; FAVORABLE SELECTION; COST GROUPS; ADJUSTMENT; EFFICIENCY; RESPOND; GERMANY; DUTCH; CARE;
D O I
10.1111/1475-6773.13065
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
Objective To study the extent to which risk equalization (RE) in competitive health insurance markets can be improved by including an indicator for being healthy. Study Setting/Data Sources This study is conducted in the context of the Dutch individual health insurance market. Administrative data on spending and risk characteristics (2011-2014) for the entire population (N = 16.6 m) as well as health survey data from a large sample (N = 387 k) are used. Study Design The indicator for being healthy is low spending in three consecutive prior years. "Low spending" is defined in three ways: belonging to the bottom 60%, 70%, or 80% of the annual spending distribution. Versions of the Dutch RE model 2017 with and without the indicator are compared on individual-level payment fit and, using the survey data, group-level payment fit. Principal Findings All three alternative models outperform the Dutch RE model 2017. However, significant unpriced risk heterogeneity remains. Compared with the 60% threshold, the 80% threshold comes with a larger improvement in fit but identifies a less selective group. Conclusions The performance of the RE model can be improved by adding an indicator for being healthy based on multiple-year low spending. However, risk-selection potential remains, warranting high priority to further improvement of RE.
引用
收藏
页码:455 / 465
页数:11
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