An experimental investigation of reputation effects of disclosure in an investment/trust game

被引:17
|
作者
Lunawat, Radhika [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Paul Merage Sch Business, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Disclosure; Reputation; Investment; Trust; TRUST; RECIPROCITY; HISTORY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.07.018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines experimentally the reputation building role of disclosure in an investment/trust game. It provides experimental evidence in support of sequential equilibrium behavior in a finitely repeated investment/trust game where information asymmetry raises the possibility of voluntary disclosure. I define two regimes, namely disclosure regime and no-disclosure regime and it is only in the disclosure regime that such disclosure of private information is a possibility. I compare investment levels across two regimes and find the startling result that investment is lower in disclosure regime. I find that this lower investment is attributable to the fact that the prior probability with which an investor in the disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy is significantly lower than the prior probability with which an investor in the no-disclosure regime believes that a manager is trustworthy. I introduce a two-stage experimental design to homogenize prior beliefs about managers' trustworthiness and find that after such homogenization, investment is higher in disclosure. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:130 / 144
页数:15
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] An experimental investigation of reputation effects of disclosure in an investment/trust game (vol 94, pg 130, 2013)
    Lunawat, Radhika
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2014, 97 : 236 - 236
  • [2] The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game
    Lunawat, Radhika
    [J]. EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2013, 22 (03) : 513 - 532
  • [3] A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game
    Willinger, M
    Keser, C
    Lohmann, C
    Usunier, JC
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 2003, 24 (04) : 447 - 466
  • [4] Effects of minimal social cues on trust in the investment game
    Xin, Ziqiang
    Liu, Youhui
    Yang, Zhixu
    Zhang, Hongchuan
    [J]. ASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2016, 19 (03) : 235 - 243
  • [5] Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects
    Boero, Riccardo
    Bravo, Giangiacomo
    Castellani, Marco
    Lagana, Francesco
    Squazzoni, Flaminio
    [J]. SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ONLINE, 2009, 14 (05): : 49 - 67
  • [6] Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
    Attanasi, Giuseppe
    Battigalli, Pierpaolo
    Manzoni, Elena
    Nagel, Rosemarie
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2019, 167 : 341 - 360
  • [7] Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game
    Charness, Gary
    Du, Ninghua
    Yang, Chun-Lei
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2011, 72 (02) : 361 - 375
  • [8] Trust behavior in a computerized investment game
    Shih, Pei-Chun
    Montoro, Alejandra
    Estrada, Eduardo
    Martinez, Agustin
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 47 : 14 - 14
  • [9] TRUST, REPUTATION, AND LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMITMENT IN INVESTMENT BANKING
    Morrison, Alan D.
    Wilhelm, William J., Jr.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS, 2015, 7 (02) : 363 - 420
  • [10] Cultures of Trust: Effects of Avatar Faces and Reputation Scores on German and Arab Players in an Online Trust-Game
    Bente, Gary
    Dratsch, Thomas
    Kaspar, Kai
    Haessler, Tabea
    Bungard, Oliver
    Al-Issa, Ahmad
    [J]. PLOS ONE, 2014, 9 (06):