Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: A Talent-Retention Explanation

被引：21
|
作者：
De Angelis, David [1 ]
Grinstein, Yaniv [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Rice Univ, Jones Grad Sch Business, Houston, TX 77251 USA
[2] Interdisciplinary Ctr IDC Herzliya, Arison Sch Business, Herzliyya, Israel
[3] Cornell Univ, Johnson Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 2020年 / 55卷 / 07期
关键词：
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MORAL HAZARD; INCENTIVES; PAY; MARKET; COMPETITION; FIRMS; RISK;
D O I：
10.1017/S0022109019000504
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts and document features that are consistent with retention motives. Second, using a novel empirical specification for detecting RPE, we find RPE is less prevalent when CEO talent is less transferrable: Among specialist CEOs, founder CEOs, and retirement-age CEOs, as well as in industries and states where the market for CEO talent is more restrictive.
引用
收藏
页码：2099 / 2123
页数：25
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