A note on local spillovers, convexity, and the strategic substitutes property in networks

被引：4
|
作者：
Billand, Pascal [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Bravard, Christophe [3 ,4 ]
Sarangi, Sudipta [5 ,6 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Lyon, F-69003 Lyon, France
[2] Univ St Etienne, F-42000 St Etienne, France
[3] GATE Lyon St Etienne, CNRS, F-42000 St Etienne, France
[4] Univ Grenoble 2, UMR GAEL 1215, F-38000 Grenoble, France
[5] DIW Berlin, Baton Rouge, LA USA
[6] Louisiana State Univ, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
来源：
THEORY AND DECISION | 2013年 / 75卷 / 02期
关键词：
Networks; Existence; Spillovers;
D O I：
10.1007/s11238-012-9328-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks.
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页码：293 / 304
页数：12
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