We investigate the R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-reducing and quality enhancing R&D. Incentives along the two directions are inversely related to the size of market demand, and independent of each other. The stability analysis shows the existence of a unique stable steady state equilibrium, which is a saddle point. Finally, we show that the Monopolist undersupplies product quality as compared to the social optimum, while its investment in the abatement of marginal cost is socially efficient. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Shanxi Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Taiyuan 030002, Peoples R ChinaShanxi Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Taiyuan 030002, Peoples R China
机构:
Shanxi Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Taiyuan 030002, Peoples R ChinaShanxi Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Taiyuan 030002, Peoples R China
机构:
Hong Kong Shue Yan Univ, SRS Consortium Adv Study Dynam Cooperat Games, North Point, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200052, Peoples R China