Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk

被引:14
|
作者
Fesselmeyer, Eric [2 ]
Santugini, Marc [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] HEC Montreal, Inst Appl Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117548, Singapore
[3] HEC Montreal, CIRPEE, Montreal, PQ, Canada
来源
关键词
Conservation; Dynamic games; Environmental risk; Renewable resources; Tragedy of the commons; NATURAL-RESOURCES; RENEWABLE RESOURCES; OWNERSHIP RISK; UNCERTAINTY; MANAGEMENT; EXTRACTION; FOREST;
D O I
10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:125 / 136
页数:12
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