Resale price maintenance and spatial price discrimination

被引:9
|
作者
Heywood, John S. [1 ]
Wang, Shiqiang [2 ]
Ye, Guangliang [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
[2] Renmin Univ China, Natl Acad Dev & Strategy, Hanqing Inst, Antitrust & Competit Policy Ctr, 59 Zhongguancun St, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
关键词
Resale price maintenance; Price floor; Price ceiling; Spatial price discrimination; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; COMPETITION; DOWNSTREAM; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this article, we examine resale price maintenance (RPM) in a classic model of downstream retailers engaging in spatial price discrimination. We show that a resale price floor increases the total profit of the upstream monopoly when transport cost (product differentiation) is relatively low. Importantly, this profitable RPM floor can also enhance social welfare and even consumer surplus. A resale price ceiling can also be profitable and always improves consumer surplus and social welfare. We argue that such findings support a rule of reason approach to RPM. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:147 / 174
页数:28
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