Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach

被引:6
|
作者
Albers, Susanne [1 ]
Kraft, Dennis [1 ]
机构
[1] Tech Univ Munich, Dept Informat, Boltzmannstr 3, D-85748 Garching, Germany
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Approximation algorithms; Behavioral economics; Commitment devices; Computational complexity; Time-inconsistent preferences; PROCRASTINATION;
D O I
10.1007/s00224-018-9883-0
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We study the complexity of motivating time-inconsistent agents to complete long term projects in a graph-based planning model proposed by Kleinberg and Oren (2014). Given a task graph G with n nodes, our objective is to guide an agent towards a target node t under certain budget constraints. The crux is that the agent may change its strategy over time due to its present-bias. We consider two strategies to guide the agent. First, a single reward is placed at t and arbitrary edges can be removed from G. Secondly, rewards can be placed at arbitrary nodes of G but no edges must be deleted. In both cases we show that it is NP-complete to decide if a given budget is sufficient to keep the agent motivated. For the first setting, we give complementing upper and lower bounds on the approximability of the minimum required budget. In particular, we devise a (1+n)-approximation algorithm and prove NP-hardness for ratios greater than n/3. We also argue that the second setting does not permit any efficient approximation unless P = NP.
引用
收藏
页码:466 / 487
页数:22
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach
    Susanne Albers
    Dennis Kraft
    Theory of Computing Systems, 2019, 63 : 466 - 487
  • [2] Computational Issues in Time-Inconsistent Planning
    Tang, Pingzhong
    Teng, Yifeng
    Wang, Zihe
    Xiao, Shenke
    Xu, Yichong
    THIRTY-FIRST AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2017, : 3665 - 3671
  • [3] Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies
    Guo, Nick L.
    Caliendo, Frank N.
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2014, 51 : 102 - 108
  • [4] Time-Inconsistent Planning: A Computational Problem in Behavioral Economics
    Kleinberg, Jon
    Oren, Sigal
    COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, 2018, 61 (03) : 99 - 107
  • [5] Long-Term Contracting With Time-Inconsistent Agents
    Gottlieb, Daniel
    Zhang, Xingtan
    ECONOMETRICA, 2021, 89 (02) : 793 - 824
  • [6] Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents
    Laureti, Carolina
    Szafarz, Ariane
    ECONOMIC MODELLING, 2023, 129
  • [7] Credit Markets with Time-Inconsistent Agents and Strategic Loan Default
    Bhattacharya, Joydeep
    Bishnu, Monisankar
    Wang, Min
    JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 2024, 56 (07) : 1803 - 1831
  • [8] NONLINEAR PDE APPROACH TO TIME-INCONSISTENT OPTIMAL STOPPING
    Miller, Christopher W.
    SIAM JOURNAL ON CONTROL AND OPTIMIZATION, 2017, 55 (01) : 557 - 573
  • [9] A Time-Inconsistent Dynamic Game
    Si, Binbin
    Ni, Yuan-Hua
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 38TH CHINESE CONTROL CONFERENCE (CCC), 2019, : 1488 - 1490
  • [10] Obesity and time-inconsistent preferences
    Dodd, Mark
    OBESITY RESEARCH & CLINICAL PRACTICE, 2008, 2 (02) : 83 - 89