Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

被引：3
|
作者：
Yang, Zhe [1 ,2 ]
Li, Li [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[2] Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Econ SUFE, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Hangzhou Ind & Commercial Trust, Hangzhou 310020, Peoples R China
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2022年 / 50卷 / 06期
关键词：
Oligopolistic markets; Stackelberg Cournot equilibria; Cooperative behavior; Multivalued inverse demand; Existence; CORE EXISTENCE THEOREM; COURNOT EQUILIBRIA; ALPHA-CORE; GAMES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2022.10.009
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We consider an oligopolistic market with a leader, finitely many followers and a multivalued inverse demand function. By assuming that there exist cooperative behaviors of followers, we introduce the notions of Stackelberg Cournot equilibria for markets with nontransferable utilities and transferable utilities. We shall prove their existence theorems in our models. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：685 / 692
页数：8
相关论文
共 41 条
12345