Does stronger corporate governance constrain insider trading? Asymmetric evidence from Australia

被引:6
|
作者
Hodgson, Allan [1 ]
Seamer, Michael [2 ]
Uylangco, Katherine [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Queensland, Business Sch, St Lucia, Qld, Australia
[2] Univ Newcastle, Newcastle Business Sch, Newcastle, NSW, Australia
[3] Queensland Univ Technol, Brisbane, Qld, Australia
来源
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2020年 / 60卷 / 03期
关键词
Corporate governance and restrictive trading policies; Insider trading; Governance asymmetry between insider transactions; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; BOARD COMPOSITION; ABNORMAL RETURNS; AUDIT COMMITTEE; MARKET; FIRM; INFORMATION; DISCLOSURE; INVESTORS; DIRECTORS;
D O I
10.1111/acfi.12423
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the role of internal corporate governance in limiting opportunities forASXcompany 'insiders' to extract abnormal returns from trading 'own shares'. We show that stronger governance translates into more restrictive insider trading policies and, while not resulting in lower insider purchase volumes, values or profits, it does reduce insider selling profitability. Firm size and increasing trading policy restrictiveness is associated with reduced insider purchase profitability while insider sale profitability is reduced by aggregate governance, trading restrictions and increasing trading policy restrictiveness. We conclude that internal firm governance constrains insider sales but not purchases, providing contrarian trading signals.
引用
收藏
页码:2665 / 2687
页数:23
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