Theory of Mind and Preschoolers' Understanding of Misdeed and Politeness Lies

被引:8
|
作者
Vendetti, Corrie [1 ,4 ]
Kamawar, Deepthi [1 ,2 ]
Andrews, Katherine E. [3 ]
机构
[1] Carleton Univ, Dept Psychol, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[2] Carleton Univ, Inst Cognit Sci, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[3] McGill Univ, Dept Educ & Counseling Psychol, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[4] 491 Paris St, Sudbury, ON P3E3B1, Canada
关键词
identification of lies; moral judgment of lies; theory of mind; false-belief understanding; second-order false-belief understanding; FALSE-BELIEF; CHILDRENS JUDGMENTS; INHIBITORY CONTROL; TRUTH; INTENTION; ADULTS; EMERGENCE;
D O I
10.1037/dev0000666
中图分类号
B844 [发展心理学(人类心理学)];
学科分类号
040202 ;
摘要
We told ninety-nine 4- and 5-year-olds stories in which speakers told lies and truths in two contexts: those told to deny a transgression (misdeeds) and those told to spare another's feelings (politeness). Participants identified each statement as a lie or as the truth, morally judged it as good or bad, and decided whether or not to assign punishment to the speaker. All children received measures of first-and second-order false-belief understanding. Although 4-year-olds were above chance in their identification accuracy, they did not differentiate between lies and truths in their moral judgments or punishments. Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds in their identification accuracy, morally judged lies more negatively than truths, and assigned speakers of lies more punishment than those who told truths. Five-year-olds also treated lies about misdeeds more negatively than politeness lies in their moral judgments and punishments. Children's identification of both lies and truths related to their first-order false-belief understanding, while their moral judgments and punishment of lies related to their second-order false-belief understanding. These findings suggest that different considerations are made when children reason about the conceptual and moral differences between lies and truths.
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页码:823 / 834
页数:12
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