Is 'Knowing that P' Identical with 'Knowing that "P" Is True'?

It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the 'KT-schema', viz, 'S knows thatp,iff, S knows that "p" is true'. The purpose of this paper is to reject theKT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that 'knowing thatp' is more than 'knowing that "p" is true'. Consequently, we shall rethink the object problem of propositional knowledge - if knowing thatpis not merely knowing that 'p' is true, then what is indeed the object of propositional knowledge? I will also attempt to solve this problem by proposing a complementary answer: knowing thatprequires at least knowing the truth ofp, plus, understanding the content ofp.