IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE FOR FIRM BOUNDARIES

被引:38
|
作者
Weigelt, Carmen [1 ]
Miller, Douglas J. [2 ]
机构
[1] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[2] Univ Illinois, Dept Business Adm, Coll Business, Champaign, IL USA
关键词
outsourcing; organization structure; knowledge-based view; task complexity; governance choice; TRANSACTION COST; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; MEASUREMENT ERROR; PERFORMANCE PAY; HUMAN-RESOURCES; GOVERNANCE; KNOWLEDGE; CAPABILITIES; DELEGATION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1002/smj.2074
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Knowledge issues are central to governance choice. Organization structure influences knowledge flows and costs of knowledge creation and exchange inside the firm. Yet the question of how a firm's internal structure affects its governance choice for new activities has received scant empirical attention. We examine the role of internal structure, specifically unit autonomy and lateral coordination, in a firm's governance decision for new, knowledge-intensive activities. The findings show that internal structure is a shift parameter' that affects governance choice by moderating the relationship between task complexity and degree of integration. The empirical setting is the U.S. banking industry and its adoption of Internet banking. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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页码:1411 / 1434
页数:24
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