The Impact of Reserve Price on Publisher Revenue in Real-Time Bidding Advertising Markets

With the rapid development of big data analytics in online marketing, real-time bidding (RTB) has emerged as a promising business model in recent years, and now becomes one of the major online advertising channels. Based on analysis of Web Cookies, RTB platforms are able to precisely identify the features and preferences of target audiences visiting publishers' websites, and forward the generated ad impressions to competing advertisers who submit bids for their best-matched audience in real-time ad auctions. In RTB markets, reserve price serves as an important tuner to exclude advertisers with low estimated values, and hence can guarantee a desirable result for the publisher from ad impression auctions. In this paper, we strive to study publishers' strategy on the reserve price, and probe the impact of reserve price on their revenues. We first analyze the ad impression auction under a direct auction mechanism. We then introduce the reserve price and study its impact on publishers' revenues under an indirect auction mechanism, and our research findings indicate that a rational positive reserve price will always improve publishers' revenues even if it is not optimal. Also, the optimal reserve price is figured out based on the advertisers' bid distributions for publishers' revenue maximization. Finally, experiments using empirical log data from real-world RTB markets are designed to validate our model and analysis, and the results provide strong support to our theoretical analysis. The experimental results also indicate that although the number of bids does not impose any influence on the optimal reserve price, it has significant impacts on publishers' revenues.