Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

被引：2
|
作者：
Schmitz, Patrick W. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cologne, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[2] CEPR, London, England
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2008年 / 101卷 / 03期
关键词：
Information gathering; Hold-up problem; Complete contracting;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.026
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A risk-neutral seller exerts effort while producing a good. The risk-neutral buyer can gather private information about his valuation. The ex ante optimal contract may encourage information gathering, although it is ex post efficient to trade regardless of the valuation. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：268 / 271
页数：4
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