What Carroll's Tortoise Actually Proves

被引：2
|
作者：
Wieland, Jan Willem [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Ghent, Dept Philosophy & Moral Sci, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium
来源：
ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE | 2013年 / 16卷 / 05期
关键词：
Rationality; Attitude; Obligation; Regress; Carroll; Tortoise; RATIONALITY;
D O I：
10.1007/s10677-012-9397-9
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll's Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557-569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.
引用
收藏
页码：983 / 997
页数：15
相关论文
共 50 条
12345