Revenue coordination contract based on stackelberg game in upsteam supply chain

被引:0
|
作者
Huo Jiazhen [1 ]
Lv Qin [1 ]
机构
[1] Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China
关键词
stackelberg game; incentive factor; the contract of profit coordination; the upsteam supply chain;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0809 ;
摘要
This paper mainly discusses a problem of revenue coordination in an upsteam supply chain, in which a supplier and a manufacturer are included, based on the balance of inventory cost and transportation cost. A two-stage stackelberg game model is erected, aiming at cost optimization. The optimality and equilibrium solution of the model are analyzed, too. the interaction of decision variables as well as that between decision variables and cost parameters are analyzed and demonstrated at last. It provides theory proof to establish the manufacturer's stimulating policy and the supplier's delivery policy.
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页码:6330 / 6333
页数:4
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