Discretion in bank loan loss allowance, risk taking and earnings management

被引:35
|
作者
Jin, Justin [1 ]
Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran [2 ]
Lobo, Gerald J. [3 ]
机构
[1] McMaster Univ, DeGroote Sch Business, Hamilton, ON, Canada
[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, Toronto, ON, Canada
[3] Univ Houston, CT Bauer Coll Business, Houston, TX USA
来源
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE | 2018年 / 58卷 / 01期
关键词
Loan loss allowance; Risk taking; Financial crisis; Earnings management; Expected loss model; ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM; INDUSTRY; FAILURES; CRISIS;
D O I
10.1111/acfi.12210
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study whether banks use the allowance for loan losses (ALL) for efficiency or for opportunistic reasons. We find that banks that had higher abnormal ALL during the period prior to the 2007-2009 crisis engaged in less risk taking during the pre-crisis period and had a lower probability of failure during the crisis period. In testing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, we find that abnormal ALL is unrelated to next period's loss avoidance and just meeting or beating the prior year's earnings. Our results suggest that banks use ALL for efficiency and not for opportunistic purposes.
引用
收藏
页码:171 / 193
页数:23
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