Instrumental reasoning

被引:0
|
作者
Broome, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland
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中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes a person from some of her existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief, practical reasoning in an intention. This paper concentrates on instrumental reasoning, one species of practical reasoning. It argues that instrumental reasoning is correct if the content of the reasoning is a valid derivation, just as theoretical reasoning is correct if its content is a valid derivation. It also argues that neither theoretical nor practical reasoning gives a reason for its conclusion. If a piece of reasoning is correct, it concludes in a state - a belief or an intention - that is rationally required by the states it is derived from, but rationally requiring a conclusion is not the same as giving a reason for it.
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页码:195 / 207
页数:13
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