Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention

被引:11
|
作者
Koch, Christof [1 ]
Tsuchiya, Naotsugu [2 ]
机构
[1] CALTECH, Div Biol, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[2] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci Psychol & Neurosci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S0140525X07002907
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.
引用
收藏
页码:509 / +
页数:9
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